

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 ISLAMA 10812 01 OF 02 150931Z

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ACTION NEA-10

INFO OCT-01 IO-10 ISO-00 DEAE-00 CIAE-00 INR-05 JUSE-00

NSAE-00 RSC-01 SNM-02 SY-04 TRSE-00 USIA-06 NSC-05

OES-03 OMB-01 AGR-05 AID-05 SS-15 HEW-02 /075 W

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FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7646

INFO AMEMBASSY KABUL

USMISSION GENEVA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 ISLAMABAD 10812

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: SNAR, PK

SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR VANCE'S DISCUSSION WITH PM BHUTTO ON
NARCOTICS

1. PRIME MINISTER BHUTTO SAW AMBASSADOR VANCE AND
MYSELF YESTERDAY MORNING FOR A DISCUSSION OF THE NARCOTICS
PROBLEM. IT WAS AN INTERESTING DISCUSSION AND I BELIEVE
IT WENT WELL FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF AMBASSADOR VANCE.

2. VANCE TOOK THE LEAD IN OUTLINING THE PURPOSES OF HIS
VISITS TO COUNTRIES IN WHICH WE HAVE A COMMON PROBLEM
ON THE GENERAL SUBJECT OF NARCOTICS. HE GAVE BHUTTO THE
FLAVOR OF HIS RECENT CONVERSATION WITH PRESIDENT FORD,
STRESSING THE IMPORTANCE THAT OUR NEW PRESIDENT PLACES
ON THIS PROBLEM. HE ALSO DISCUSSED AT SOME LENGTH THE
STRONG FEELINGS OF THE VERY SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER OF THE
MEMBERS OF OUR HOUSE AND SENATE ON THIS SUBJECT. TO
AMPLIFY THIS POINT, HE DISCUSSED THEIR ATTITUDE AND REACTION
TO RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN TURKEY. THE PURPOSE OF THIS,
OF COURSE, WAS TO IMPLY THAT THE MOOD ON THIS SUBJECT
WAS SUCH THAT IT COULD ALSO AFFECT OUR OVERALL RELATIONS
WITH PAKISTAN AS FAR AS OUR CONGRESS WAS CONCERNED. I
FEEL CERTAIN BHUTTO GOT THE POINT.

CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 02 ISLAMA 10812 01 OF 02 150931Z

3. AMBASSADOR VANCE ADDED, THAT WHILE FEELINGS RAN STRONG ON THIS SUBJECT AT HOME, WE NEVERTHELESS WANTED TO BE REALISTIC, AND CERTAINLY NOT IMPRACTICABLE, AS REGARDS TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE VIEWS AND PROBLEMS OF LEADERS OF COUNTRIES ABROAD WITH WHOM WE WORK ON THE NARCOTICS PROBLEM. HE ASKED FOR THE VIEWS OF THE PRIME MINISTER, INCLUDING THOSE ON THE GENERAL FIELD OF PRODUCTION, AS WELL AS CONTROL.

4. BHUTTO TOLD VANCE THAT HE REGARDED THE DRUG PROBLEM AS A CURSE, AND THAT ALL PRACTICAL MEANS SHOULD BE TAKEN BY EVERYONE TO BRING IT UNDER CONTROL. HE SAID HE HAD FIRST BEEN APPROACHED ON A HIGH LEVEL ABOUT THE PROBLEM IN JULY 1972 WHEN AN EMISSARY (HE THOUGHT GROSS) BROUGHT A LETTER TO HIM FROM PRESIDENT NIXON. HE SAID HE HAD TOLD THE EMISSARY THAT HE HAD AGREED WITH NIXON THAT IT WAS IN THE COMMON INTERESTS TO WIPE OUT THE DRUG PROBLEM, AND HAD ADDED THAT HE HAD BEEN ACTING IN GOOD FAITH WHEN HE HAD SAID HE WOULD DO WHAT HE COULD IN PAKISTAN. HE SAID HE HAD PUT A GOOD MAN IN CHARGE (ORAKZAILN HAD ELEVATED THE PAKISTAN NARCOTICS CONTROL BOARD, AND GAVE INSTRUCTIONS THAT THEY ENERGETICALLY TACKLE THE PROBLEM. HE SAID HE THEN BEGAN TO FIND OUT THE MATTER WAS NOT ALL THAT SIMPLE. HE SAID IT WAS QUITE EASY TO BE AGAINST SIN, BUT AS THEY BECAME MORE ACTIVE THEY QUICKLY RAN UP AGAINST ITS POLITICAL ASPECTS AS WELL AS THE ECONOMIC ASPECTS AS FAR AS THE GROWER WAS CONCERNED. HE ALSO FOUND OUT THAT THE PLACE WHERE THE POPPY IS GROWN IN PAKISTAN MADE ABRUPT CORRECTIVE ACTION VERY DIFFICULT FROM A POLITICAL POINT OF VIEW. THE OBVIOUS ANSWER, OF COURSE, WAS TO TRY TO FIND WAYS TO REHABILITATE THE ECONOMIC STATUS OF THE AREA WHERE POPPIES WERE GROWN, BUT THIS TOOK BOTH RESOURCES AND TIME. IN THIS REGARD HE REGRETTEED THE POPPY AREA OF PAKISTAN WAS PRIMARILY ALONG THE BORDER WITH AFGHANISTAN. AFTER DAOUD TOOK OVER AGAIN IN AFGHANISTAN, THE POLITICAL TENSION HAD BEEN INCREASED IN THE FRONTIER AREAS BECAUSE OF DAOUD'S CAMPAIGN FOR PUSHTUNISTAN, AND THE ACTIVITIES OF THE AFGHANS IN THE FRONTIER AREAS. HE GAVE AN INTERESTING DESCRIPTION OF THE RATHER "SPOILED" NATURE OF THE FRONTIER PEOPLE, WHO THROUGHOUT THE YEARS HAD BENEFITED FROM BRIBES ORIGINATED ON BOTH SIDES OF THE BORDER TO TAKE POSITIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 ISLAMA 10812 01 OF 02 150931Z

AGAINST THE INTERESTS OF THE OTHER SIDE. HE SAID TALK ABOUT BANNING THE POPPY HAD BEEN IMMEDIATELY USED AGAINST HIM, HIS PARTY, AND HIS GOVERNMENT.

5. BHUTTO SAID THAT ALL POPPY PRODUCTION WERE SUPPOSED TO BE SOLD TO THE GOVERNMENT, BUT OF COURSE THIS WAS NOT THE WAY IT WORKED OUT. HE HAD TOLD HIS PEOPLE TO ENFORCE TO THE EXTENT THEY COULD GETTING ALL OF IT TO COME TO THE

GOVERNMENT, BUT THE RESULTS WERE DISAPPOINTING. IN THE SAME VEIN THERE WAS A GENERAL BAN ON HASHISH AND ALL TRAFFIC IN HASHISH WAS ILLEGAL, BUT SOME OF IT WENT ON NEVERTHELESS. HE SAID HE WOULD BE JUST AS HAPPY AS THE UNITED STATES IF THEY COULD GET RID OF THE PROBLEM, AND HE STOOD READY TO DO WHAT HE COULD THAT WAS PRACTICAL FOR HIM TO DO. HE WANTED US TO UNDERSTAND HIS DIFFICULTIES WHILE WE CONTINUED TO WORK TOGETHER ON THE PROBLEM. HE SAID HE WAS BEING FRANK AND OPEN AS HE DID NOT WANT THE US TO BE UNDER ANY MISUNDERSTANDING, BOTH AS TO HIS OWN POSITION, AND THE PROBLEMS HE FACED. HE SAID HE WOULD HAVE AS STRICT AND VIGILANT CONTROLS AS HE COULD. HE SAID HE AND HIS PEOPLE WOULD ALWAYS BE READY TO DISCUSS ALL ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM ALL THE WAY FROM ABOLITION TO THE INSTITUTION OF CONTROLS IN SUCH A WAY THAT ILLEGAL POPPY PRODUCTS AND HASHISH WERE NOT SMUGGLED OUT OF THE COUNTRY. BYROADE

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PAGE 01 ISLAMA 10812 02 OF 02 151059Z

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INFO OCT-01 IO-10 ISO-00 DEAE-00 CIAE-00 INR-05 JUSE-00

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FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7647

INFO AMEMBASSY KABUL

USMISSION GENEVA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 ISLAMABAD 10812

6. VANCE SAID THAT HE COULD DO NOTHING BUT APPLAUD THE STATEMENT THAT THE PRIME MINISTER HAD GIVEN. HE SAID HE LOOKED FORWARD TO HIS SCHEDULED TALKS WITH SENIOR OFFICIALS OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S GOVERNMENT ON MORE SPECIFIC ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM.

7. TAKING ADVANTAGE OF VISIT OF VANCE TO GET INTO SPECIFICS

OF CONCERN TO US, I SAID THAT WE UNDERSTOOD THE PROBLEMS HE REFERRED TO IN THE BORDER REGIONS, BUT HOPED THAT AREAS COULD STILL BE FOUND UPON WHICH EARLY SIGNS OF PROGRESS COULD BE MADE. I SAID THAT WE HOPED HIS PEOPLE WOULD GO AHEAD VIGOROUSLY WITH DEVELOPMENT PLANS FOR A SPECIFIC AREA, PREFERABLY SWABI IN THE NORTHWEST FRONTIER PROVINCE, THAT COULD BEGIN TO FORESHADOW A LONG RANGE SOLUTION. IF HIS PEOPLE COULD GO AHEAD WITH SUCH PLANS AND THEN WORK JOINTLY WITH US, PERHAPS A GENERAL PLAN COULD BE WORKED OUT THAT COULD BENEFIT FROM ASSETS FROM OUR SIDE. HE SAID BY ALL MEANS SUCH PLANNING SHOULD PROCEED, AND HE WOULD TALK TO HIS PEOPLE ABOUT IT. I REPLIED THAT ONE BOTTLE-NECK SEEMED TO BE OUR INABILITY TO GET THE NECESSARY MAPS TO LAUNCH AN AERIAL SURVEY OF THE AREA, WHICH WE WERE OTHERWISE PREPARED TO DO. BHUTTO JOKINGLY SAID HE THOUGHT WE HAD MORE MAPS OF PAKISTAN THEN THEY DID* I SAID APPARENTLY NOT SO, AS OUR PEOPLE THOUGHT MAPS OF THE

CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 02 ISLAMA 10812 02 OF 02 151059Z

AREA WERE ESSENTIAL TO MAKE THE SURVEY PRODUCTIVE. I SAID I COULD ONLY SPECULATE THAT HIS DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE MAY HAVE FELT RELEASE OF MAPS WAS A SECURITY MATTER. HE SAID HE DID NOT SEE ANY REASON WE COULD NOT HAVE THE MAPS AND HE

WOULD GET INTO IT.

8. I THEN SAID WE WERE CONCERNED THAT A CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF OUR EQUIPMENT WAS IN THE PROCESS OF ARRIVING IN KARACHI FOR THE FIU UNITS, BUT THAT THE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITS HAD NOT PROCEEDED TO THE POINT WHERE IT SEEMED THEY COULD EFFECTIVELY RECEIVE AND UTILIZE IT. I SAID IT SEEMED THAT A PART OF THE PROBLEM WUES AN INEFFICIENT BUDGET FOR PNCB TO WHIP THEIR ORGANIZATION INTO SHAPE. . ADMITTING THAT IT WAS A PURELY INTERNAL MATTER, I SUGGESTED HE MIGHT WANT TO CONSIDER WHETHER IT WOULD BE EASIER TO HAVE THESE UNITS PLACED UNDER AN EXISTING AGENCY SUCH AS THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR, WHICH WAS ALREADY FUNDED, HAD THE POWER OF ARREST, ETC. BHUTTO SAID HE SAW THE POINT AND WOULD CONSIDER IT. HE ALSO SAID THAT HE WOULD INSTRUCT HIS PEOPLE TO TALK TO US ABOUT THE THREE MATTERS I HAD RAISED AND HOPED THAT THE SPECIFICS COULD BE WORKED OUT.

9. BHUTTO EXPRESSED HIS APPRECIATION OF HAVING A CHANCE TO TALK TO VANCE ON THIS PROBLEM. HE TOLD VANCE THAT HE WANTED TO PROCEED IN THIS ASPECT OF OUR RELATIONS, AS IN ALL OTHERS, WITH COMPLETE MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING AS WE GO ALONG.

BYROADE

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